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An Acerbic Look at the Death Penalty
in Ohio
Lawrence Herman
The major problems of the criminal law are two: what behavior
should be made criminal, and what should be done with persons who
commit crimes.'
INTRODUCTION
The question of what to do with criminal offenders reaches to the
philosophical roots of any system of criminal law. At times the problem
is debated in terms of its more superficial manifestations such as the ap-
propriate form and conditions
THE AUTHOR (A.B., LL.B., University of Cin- of institutionalization or other
cinnati) is an Associate Professor at The Ohio
State University College of Law. From 1959 treatment. However, when the
to 1961, Professor Herman was a member of problem is placed in the con-
the faculty of the Western Reserve University
School of Law. text of capital punishment,
superficiality cannot be main-
tained. The brutal question is whether the system ought to permit the
killing of certain offenders; and the answer ultimately involves an excru-
ciating examination of the philosophy of criminal law.
It is not surprising, then, that the problem of the death penalty is one
of international interest. Indeed, in 1959, the General Assembly of the
United Nations requested one of its councils to undertake a world-wide
study of the problem, and the results of that study are now embodied in
a special United Nations publication.2
Regarding Anglo-American law, interest in the problem has spanned
at least 300 years. In 1659, Parliament was requested to consider, among
other proposals for reform, the suggestion that the death penalty be
limited to the offense of murder.3 At the other end of the spectrum, the
most recent American criminal law casebooks contain a renewed emphasis
upon the problem.' A telescoping of highlights in the Anglo-American
1. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 6 (1940).
2. Ancel, Capital Punishment, U.N. DEP'T. EcoN. & Soc. COUNCIL (U.N. Doc. No.
ST/SOA/SD/9, SALES No.: 62.IV 2 1962). Several years ago, the fifteen nations compris-
ing the Council of Europe established a committee to study the death penalty and feasible al-
ternatives. See 1 BRIr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 377-78 (1961). The committee recently rendered
a report without express recommendation. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1962).
3. The incident is recounted in Ancel, supra note 2, at 59.
4. See DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 334-48 (1962); HALL &
GLEuCK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 85-86 (2d ed. 1958); INBAU & SOWLE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65-71 (1960); PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
555-58 (1962).
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experience would include abolition of the death penalty in certain states,5
the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1953,6
the British Homicide Act of 1957, the Sellin Report to the American
Law Institute,8 the recent Delaware experience of abolition followed by
restoration,' and substantial modifications in the death penalty made by
the New York legislature in 1963.10
In Ohio, the problem has been one of continuing interest to all
branches of government. In 1857, the Ohio Supreme Court observed
that "punishment by death is provided only for the crime of the greatest
atrocity; and even for this it has been opposed by some as a relic of
barbarism, and as unsupported by an enlightened view of human rights."
1
'
At the executive level, reference may be made to the abolition efforts of
Governor Joseph Vance in the 1830's,12 to Governor Harry L. Davis'
undertaking, in 1922, to collect comparative data relating to deterrence, 3
and, most recently, to the abolition proposals of Governor Michael V.
DiSalle.'4 The problem of executive clemency aside, gubernatorial as-
saults against the death penalty have been directed primarily toward per-
suasion of the Ohio General Assembly. Although the General Assembly
has never abandoned its position in favor of the death penalty, it has
given constant attention to the problem. 5 On two occasions an abolition
5. The abolition states are Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Qualified
abolition states are Michigan (retained for treason), North Dakota (treason and murder com-
mitted by prisoner serving life sentence for murder), and Rhode Island (murder committed
by prisoner serving life sentence for murder). In ten states, experimental abolition was fol-
lowed by restoration. The states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington.
6. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT (1953).
7. 5 & 6 ELIZ. 2, c. 11. The act treats as capital murder the following: murder in the course
of theft, murder by shooting or explosion, murder in the course of resisting arrest, murder of
a police officer who is in the execution of his duty, murder by a prisoner, and repeated murder.
In addition, the act provides that if two or more persons participate in a capital murder, only
the person whose act caused the death shall be subject to the death penalty. For a contem-
porary critique of the act, see Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise
the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 624 (1957).
8. SELLIN, The Death Penalty, in MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) [here-
inafter cited as SELLrN].
9. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 107 (Supp. 1962).
10. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1045-45(a). The act repeals the mandatory death penalty for
murder. It provides: (1) that there may be a negotiated plea for a life sentence, (2) that,
upon a finding of guilty of a capital offense, sentence is to be determined in a separate pro-
ceeding, and (3) that the death sentence may be imposed only by a unanimous jury.
11. Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131, 174 (1857).
12. See OHIO LEGISLATrVE SERVICE COMMISSION, REPORT No. 46, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
8-9 (1961) [hereinafter cited as OHIO REPORT].
13. Id. at 10-11.
14. Governor DiSalle's special message urging the abolition of capital punishment is con-
tained in 128 OHIO S. Jou. 155-56, 1431-38 (1959).
15. See OHIO REPORT 8-11.
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bill was passed in one house, only to be defeated in the other house.16
On numerous other occasions proposals ranging from outright abolition
to a requirement that the death penalty depend upon affirmative jury
action have received legislative scrutiny.
During the session of the 105th Ohio General Assembly in 1963,
three bills were introduced relevant to the problem under consideration.
H.B. 292 substituted for the death penalty in all cases a sentence of im-
prisonment for life. H.B. 337 retained the death penalty, but provided
that the trial judge or a majority of the judges of a reviewing court had
the discretion to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment. H.B. 416
also retained the death penalty, but provided for a sentence of life im-
prisonment unless the jury affirmatively recommended capital punish-
ment. In addition to these bills a resolution (H.J.R. 28) was introduced
to submit to the electorate the question of abolition versus retention.
All of the proposals were referred to the House Judiciary Committee
where, after two days of hearings, they died pursuant to motions to post-
pone consideration indefinitely. 7
Although the proposals suffered an easily predictable fate, both
abolitionists and retentionists presented vigorous arguments at the hear-
ings. As might be expected, the retentionists were represented by law
enforcement authorities, and the abolitionists by a law teacher and a
criminologist. I was the law teacher, and my views on the matter are
consequently subject to challenge for bias. With that caveat broadcast,
it will be the burden of this paper to analyse and criticize the arguments
advanced by the retentionists. At the outset, it should be made dear that
arguments based on morality (i.e., whether the state has the moral right
to kill or whether capital punishment is morally defensible as the only
means of expiation) will not be considered herein. Reluctance to con-
sider these arguments should not be taken as a suggestion that they are
irrelevant. The point is, simply, that after these arguments are pushed
to the hilt, there is stalemate. First, each side remains convinced of the
validity of its moral position and of the invalidity of any other position.
Second, there is no empirical method by which validity or invalidity can
be demonstrated. Therefore, it is far more fruitful, in my opinion, to
avoid the moral cul-de-sac and to concentrate upon those arguments as to
which there is some body of evidence.
Also, it is necessary to note that in Ohio the death penalty may be
imposed only for various forms of first-degree murder 8 and for kidnap-
16. In 1850, the Senate passed an abolition bill by a vote of 18 to 12. In 1949, the House
passed an abolition bill by a vote of 69 to 35. See OHIO REPORT 9, 11.
17. OHIO H. JOUR. 7, 9-11 (April 18, 1963).
18. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2901.01 (first-degree murder); 2901.02 (killing by obstructing
or damaging a railroad); 2901.03 (Supp. 1963) (killing a prison guard); 2901.04 (killing
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pings in which the victim is not released unharmed prior to trial. 9 Typi-
cally, debate upon the capital punishment problem primarily concerns
the offense of murder and only passing reference is made to kidnapping 0
The same limitation will obtain in this article.
IS THE DEATH PENALTY A DETERRENT?
Whether the death penalty is a deterrent to murder was the principal
question debated before the House Judiciary Committee. Antecedent to
any discussion of the question, however, it is essential to define its con-
tours. Assuredly, the death penalty is a deterrent to the defendant who
is executed. He will never again commit murder, nor will he engage in
any other form of conduct for good or evil. However, this type of specific
deterrence is not the basis of the retentionists' argument. Rather, the
basis is twofold: that the death penalty generally deters others from com-
mitting murder, and that it does so with greater effectiveness than life
imprisonment. It is to these two facets that consideration must be given.2'
Although the retentionists argued that it is difficult to measure the
deterrent effect of the death penalty, they asserted repeatedly that it is a
deterrent. The argument proceeded along a variety of fronts. Initially,
it was claimed by analogy that the existence of police departments is a
deterrent to crime. Whether this claim is correct (and I certainly have
no evidence to disprove it) need not be determined. Conceding that the
threat of detection and apprehension is a deterrent, the analogy still fails
because it gives no help in answering the question of whether the death
penalty is a more effective deterrent than a sentence to life imprisonment.
Next, it was asserted that punishment is a deterrent and that there is
a direct relationship between the severity of punishment and the efficacy
of the deterrent. In support of this assertion, reference was made to the
deterrent impact of increased punishment upon kidnapping and narcotics
offenses. In addition, the unsupported claim was made that the threat
of the death sentence has reduced the incidence of subversion, assassina-
tion, and organized crime. Regarding the latter claim, a denial is ade-
quate refutation. There simply is no evidence that the death penalty has
any peculiar deterrent effect on the three named offenses. Moreover,
subversion and assassination are the offenses of zealots, persons whose
a police officer); 2901.09 (killing certain federal officials); 2901.10 (killing certain state
officials); 2901.28 (killing during kidnapping).
19. Omo REv. CODE § 2901.27.
20. Although kidnapping is a capital offense in some thirty-five states (see SELLIN 4)
execution of the death penalty is infrequent. During the period 1930-1957, 3,096 persons
were executed for murder in the United States. SELLin 6. During the same period, only
seventeen persons were executed for kidnapping. SELLIN 7. See also OHIO REPORT 17.
21. In the following paragraphs of the text, comment is made upon the retentionists' argu-
ments. It should be made clear, however, that not every retentionist advocated every argu-
ment.
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motivation makes it highly unlikely that they will be deterred by the
threat of any punishment; and organized criminal activity (murder, in
the instant context) flourishes in such capital punishment states as Illi-
nois and Ohio.22 Much less laughable and much more demanding of
careful consideration is the argument relating to kidnapping and nar-
cotics offenses. There is some statistical evidence that an increase in the
punishment for these offenses was followed by a decrease in incidence.23
The important questions, however, are: (1) whether a causal relationship
exists between punishment and incidence; and (2) if so, whether it rests
upon a general principle of deterrence broad enough to comprehend not
only a different offense (murder) but also the greater effectiveness of
the death penalty over the penalty of life imprisonment. Answers to
these questions are difficult, if not impossible. Although the position of
the retentionists has a practical or logical appeal, the problem is compli-
cated by certain variables. Narcotics offenses and kidnapping are almost
always planned crimes in which money is sought. Murder, even though
premeditated,24 seldom involves such planning25 and frequently involves
22. In a recent article, the Attorney General of the United States noted that there have been
thirty-seven gangland killings in Chicago since 1960, and that there have been seventy bomb-
ings in the Youngstown area since 1950. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy Defines the Menace,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1963, § 6 (Magazine), pp. 15, 105.
23. The evidence relating to kidnapping can be found in 1940 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 80,
155; 1936 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 127; 1934 Ar'xy GEN. ANN. REP. 130; 1933 ArT'y
GEN. ANN. REP. 105; Fisher & Maguire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law, 12
N.Y.U.L. REV. 646 (1935). A scrutiny of the evidence relating to narcotics offenses in
Ohio reveals that the retentionists may have jumped the gun in drawing conclusions. It is
true that both the number of narcotics cases disposed of and the number of convictions declined
sharply from 1956 (the first year of increased penalties) to 1959. See OHIO DEPT. MENTAL
HYGIENE & CORRECTION, CRIMINAL COURT STATISTICS 23 (1955); id. at 19 (1956); id.
at 24 (1957); id. at 25 (1958); id. at 17 (1959). However, in 1960 there was a dramatic
increase to pre-1956 levels, and, although there were decreases in 1961 and 1962, the 1962
level is higher than the 1956 level. See id. at 13 (1960); id. at 15 (1961). The 1962 fig-
ures are not in published form. They were furnished by an employee of the agency. The
figures for the period 1955-1962 are as follows:
Total Cases Other
Year Disposed of Eliminated Convicted Offense
1955 283 26 257
1956 216 36 180
1957 239 48 190 1
1958 201 31 169 1
1959 176 41 134 1
1960 266 67 198 1
1961 242 41 201
1962 240 41 198 1
24. In Ohio, premeditation does not require substantial planning. See Shoemaker v. State,
12 Ohio 43 (1843). On the question of how much planning is required, Ohio courts are
in disagreement. In Tolliver v. State, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 488 (Ct. App. 1930), it was held error
to instruct the jury that premeditation can come into existence in a moment. However, in
State v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 248, 108
N.E.2d 282 (1952), the court upheld an instruction that if the defendant had time to con-
sider what he was doing, he had time to premeditate. Since premeditation often spells the
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no financial gain. 6  Further, insofar s kidnapping is concerned, federal
criminal liability subjects the potential offender to the substantial risk of
detection and apprehension via the highly successful techniques of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation."7 Moreover, regarding Ohio narcotics
offenses, 2 8 the threat of increased penalties is real because there is no lee-
way under Ohio's indeterminate sentence procedure for mitigation of the
legislatively prescribed minima and maxima. 0  In the case of murder,
however, a jury recommendation of mercy will obviate the death pen-
alty,3" and, as will clearly appear later in this article,3 ' the recommenda-
tion is made with a frequency sufficient to discredit the reality of the
threat of death. Consequently, there is substantial reason to doubt the
validity of an analogy between kidnapping and narcotics offenses on the
one hand and murder on the other hand. Indeed, it is apparent from the
testimony at the hearings that even the retentionists entertained this doubt.
The principal exponent of the retentionists' position, Cleveland's
Chief of Police Wagner, admitted that, in the "average murder," the de-
fendant does not consider the punishment before he acts. But, he did
take the position that the death penalty is a deterrent to the organized or
planned killing. It is not clear whether he had in mind a so-called "syn-
dicate" killing, the use of a hired killer for private purposes as in Cali-
fornia's celebrated case of People v. Duncan,32 or simply a case in which
there was an appreciable gap in time between the conception of the plan
and its execution. Whatever the correct interpretation may be, it is suffi-
cient to note that Chief Wagner's position of "limited deterrence" is in-
difference between first-degree murder, OHIO REV. CODE 5 2901.01 (with its attendant per-
missible death sentence), and second-degree murder, OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.05 (life sen-
tence), the phraseology of tho instruction, as yet unsettled, may carry with it the defendant's
life. Thus, in terms of the difficulty of distinguishing between the capital and the non-capital
offense, there is an argument against the death penalty.
25. See BENSING & SCIROEDER, HoMIcIDE IN AN URBAN CoMMuNrry 72 (1960). In
their inquiry into homicide in Cleveland, the authors found that most homicides arose from
petty quarrels, marital discord, and non-marital love or sex disputes.
26. Ibid.
27. For a case in which the defendant inferentially claimed some awareness of this fact, see
United States v. Powell, 24 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Tenn. 1938) (defendant, charged with trans-
porting a kidnapped person from Tennessee to Georgia, asserted that he entered Georgia
believing that he was still in Tennessee and that he would not otherwise have entered Georgia).
28. OHIo REV. CODE 5§ 3719.01-99 (Supp. 1963).
29. Penalties for various violations run a huge gamut from a fine of five dollars to impris-
onment for life. OHIo REV. CODE § 3719.99 (Supp. 1963). Regarding the indeterminate
sentence mechanism, see OHIO REV. CODE § 5145.01 (Supp. 1963). To the extent that a
sentence to imprisonment can be suspended, O1Ho REV. CODE § 2951.02, the judge does
exercise control. However, probation is not available for certain narcotics offenses. OHIO
REV. CODE § 3719.99(L) (Supp. 1963).
30. See statutes cited note 18 supra.
31. See p. 527-28 infra.
32. 53 Cal. 2d 803, 350 P.2d 103 (1960). In this case, the court upheld conviction of
defendant who used hired killers to murder her daughter-in-law.
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defensible not only because the bulk of murders do not involve such or-
ganization or planning,33 but also because the death penalty is imposed in
cases in which such planning is absent."4
At this point, it should be observed that the hearings did not begin
with the testimony of the retentionists. The abolitionists, as supporters
of the proposed legislation, made the initial presentation. The gravamen
of their argument was the lack of evidence that the death penalty is a
more effective deterrent than life imprisonment. To evaluate critically
the retentionists' reply, it is necessary to set out the abolitionists' argument
in detail.
Initially, the abolitionists stressed certain facts regarding Ohio's ex-
perience with the death penalty which were said to cast doubt upon the
reality of the threat of death and, hence, upon its deterrent effect. First,
it was argued that if the death penalty is a deterrent, deterrence depends
in part upon awareness not only of the existence of the death penalty but
also of the horror of an execution. 5 However, Ohio law prohibits vir-
tually every potential offender from attending an execution," and thereby
frustrates opportunity for awareness. Next, it was urged that the efficacy
of an assumed deterrent must depend upon the frequency with which the
deterrent is invoked. In this regard, emphasis was placed upon statisti-
cal evidence indicating a marked decline in the use of the death penalty
in Ohio. The evidence fell into three categories: (1) total number of
executions, (2) ratio of executions to non-negligent homicides, and
(3) ratio of executions to indictments for first-degree murder. Specifi-
cally, the statistical evidence was as follows: (1) Regarding the total
number of executions, from 1920 through 1939, 167 persons were exe-
cuted in Ohio. However, from 1940 through 1962, only 88 persons were
executed" even though the population increase between 1940 and 1960
33. BENSING & SCHROEDER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 72.
34. Felony-murder, OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.01, is an example. See State v. Salter, 149
Ohio St. 264, 78 N.E.2d 575 (1948), in which the death penalty was imposed upon a de-
fendant who, without desiring to do so, killed a girl while raping her. In their study of
homicide in Cleveland, Professors Bensing and Schroeder found that of 22 persons convicted
on an indictment charging premeditated murder with a count of felony-murder, 8 were sen-
tenced to death. However, of 11 persons convicted on an indictment charging premeditated
murder with no count of felony murder, only 1 was sentenced to death. BENSING &
SCHROEDER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 27.
35. See Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRM. L., C. & P.S.
347, 351 (1955).
36. OHIO REV. CODE § 2949.25 permits the following to attend an execution: (1) the
warden or his deputy, (2) guards, (3) the sheriff of the forum county, (4) the Director of
Public Welfare or his agent, (5) the Commissioner of Corrections, (6) penitentiary physi-
cians, (7) defendant's clergyman, (8) three designees of defendant, and (9) representatives
of three newspapers in the forum county as well as one reporter for each daily newspaper
published in Columbus.
37. See Ball, supra note 35, at 350.
38. OHIO REPORT 36. The report covers the period 1910-1959. Figures in the text were
[Vol. 15:512
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was almost three million persons."s (2) Regarding the ratio of executions
to non-negligent homicides, from 1910 to 1959, there was one execution
for every 82 homicides. However, from 1950 to 1959, there was one
execution for every 116 homicides.4" (3) Regarding the ratio of execu-
tions to indictments for first-degree murder, slightly more than 1 out of
every 4 indictments for first-degree murder results in a conviction of
first-degree murder; approximately 1 out of every 4 convictions results
in a death sentence; and approximately 1 out of every 3 death sentences
is commuted.41 Thus, 100 indictments for first-degree murder will re-
sult in approximately 28 convictions, which will result in approximately
7 death sentences, which will result in approximately 5 executions. The
conclusion drawn by the abolitionists was that the threat of the death
sentence was so slight that it could not have the deterrent effect ascribed
to it by the retentionists.
Next, the abolitionists discussed the most comprehensive statistical
study of the death penalty - the report of Professor Thorsten Sellin of
the University of Pennsylvania.42 This report, it was asserted, undercut
any argument based on a theory of deterrence. In his study, Professor
Sellin sought to answer four questions relevant to a claim that the death
penalty more effectively deters murder than a sentence to life imprison-
ment: (1) with reference to groups of neighboring states having similar
economic conditions and population components, whether an abolition
state has a higher homicide rate than a retention state; (2) whether the
safety of policemen is endangered by the abolition of capital punishment;
(3) with reference to states in which abolition was followed by restora-
tion, whether abolition increased the homicide rate and whether restora-
tion decreased it; and (4) whether the publicity attending either the im-
position or the execution of a death sentence produces a decrease in homi-
cide rate.
The evidence relating to a comparison of neighboring states is of
brought up to date on the basis of information furnished by an employee of the Ohio State
Penitentiary.
39. In 1940, Ohio's population was 6,907,612. In 1950, it was 7,946,627. In 1960, it
was 9,706,397. WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FAcrs 255 (1963). Although the number
of executions has diminished, Ohio holds an unfortunately high rank in comparison to other
states. For the period 1930-1957, the leading execution states were New York (309),
Georgia (280), California (242), North Carolina (205), Texas (189), Ohio (158), and
Pennsylvania (146). SELiN 5. For the period 1930-1959, statistics relating to Ohio and
eight neighboring states show that Ohio, with 25.6% of this total population (1950), ac-
counted for about 43 % of the total number of executions. OHIO REPORT 21.
40. OHio REPORT 36.
41. OHIo REPORT 50. Cleveland statistics for the period 1947 through 1953 indicate that
there were 116 indictments for first-degree murder, 33 convictions, and 9 death sentences.
BENSiNG & SCHROEDER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 23. Regarding the infrequency of execu-
tions in other jurisdictions, see Younger, Capital Punishment: A Sharp Medicine Reconsidered,
42 A.B.AJ. 113 (1956).
42. The report, note 8 supra, was made to the American Law Institute.
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particular interest to Ohioans because one of the groups comprised Ohio
and Indiana (retention states), and Michigan (an abolition state). For
the period 1930-1955, Professor Sellin found that Ohio's homicide rate
was higher than Michigan's in 31 of the 35 years. 3 In evaluating these
figures, it must be observed that Ohio is substantially more urbanized than
is Michigan,44 and that urbanization is a factor in high crime rates. How-
ever, the comparison between Michigan and Indiana is equally revealing:
Indiana's rate was higher in 17 years, Michigan's rate was higher in 14
years, and the rates were the same in the remaining 4 years.4" The Ohio-
Indiana-Michigan comparison dramatically illustrates the absence of evi-
dence of a relationship between the death penalty and a decreased homi-
cide rate.4"  And the illustration is not one of a kind. Professor Sellin
noted the same absence in all of the other comparisons.4" Accordingly,
he concluded:
1. The level of the homicide death rates varies in different groups
of states. It is lowest in the New England areas and in the northern
states of the middle west and lies somewhat higher in Michigan, Indiana
and Ohio.
2. Within each group of states having similar social and economic
conditions and populations, it is impossible to distinguish the abolition
state from the others.
3. The trends of the homicide death rates of comparable states
with or without the death penalty are similar.
43. SELLIN 28. Figures through 1958 show that Ohio's homicide rate was higher in 34 of
the 38 years. OHIO REPORT 40. In making his study, Professor Sellin used the crude homi-
cide rate. The rate was computed by using the number of reported deaths classified by the
authorities as intentional homicide. Statistics relating to capital homicide were not available.
However, as noted by Professor Sellin: "Students of criminal statistics have examined [the
data relating to intentional homicides] with some care and have arrived at the conclusion
that the homicide death rate is adequate for an estimate of the trend of murder. This con-
clusion is based on the assumption that the proportion of capital murders in the total of such
deaths remains reasonably constant." SELLIN 22.
44. Of the fifty most populous cities in the United States, Ohio has six. The six, according
to rank and 1960 population are Cleveland (8th), 876,050; Cincinnati (21st), 502,550; Co-
lumbus (28th), 471,316; Toledo (39th), 318,003; Akron (45th), 290,315; and Dayton
(49th), 262,332. WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 253 (1963). Michigan had only
one of the fifty most populous cities, Detroit (5th), 1,670,144. Michigan's second city is
Flint (62d), 196,940. Ibid. Ohio's population density in 1960 was 236.9 persons per square
mile. Michigan's population density was 137.2. Id. at 258.
45. SELLIN 28. Indiana has but one of the fifty largest cities, Indianapolis (26th), 476,258.
Indiana's second city is Gary (70th), 178,320. Id. at 253. Indiana's population density fig-
ure as of 1960, 128.9, was smaller than Michigan's. Id. at 258.
46. As pointed out in Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the
United States, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 457 (1957), it is important to distinguish between
two propositions: "(1) There is no evidence from the statistics that the death penalty is a
superior deterrent to imprisonment. (2) There is evidence that the death penalty is not a
superior deterrent to imprisonment." The available statistics support the first proposition.
Whether proof of the first proposition constitutes evidence of the second proposition is oper,
to question. Whether proof of the first proposition, standing alone, is adequate reason for
abolition will depend upon a dogmatic view as to which side bears the burden of proof. See
note 66 infra and accompanying text.
47. SELLIN 23-24.
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The inevitable conclusion is that executions have no discernible ef-
fect on homicide death rates which, as we have seen, are regarded as
adequate indicators of capital murder rates.48
Professor Sellin's conclusion was buttressed by his findings on the
questions of police safety and impact of publicizing the imposition or
execution of the death sentence. The evidence, admittedly of variable
quality and quantity,49 did not support the claims (1) that the police are
safer in retention states than in abolition states, ° and (2) that publicizing
either the imposition or the execution of the death sentence was followed
by a decrease in homicide rate."' Of greater significance was his analysis
48. SELLIN 34.
49. Regarding police safety, Professor Sellin was unable to determine (1) whether the
proportion of criminals who carry lethal weapons is greater for abolition states than for re-
tention states, and (2) whether the proportion of criminals who use such weapons, with or
without injury to police, is greater for abolition states than for retention states. SELLiN 53.
Also, he was unable to determine the number of woundings in the cities under consideration.
Id. at 55. Accordingly, he was remitted to using figures relating to killing of policemen.
Ibid. Even as to killings, however, the information was incomplete because no reports were
received from the police departments in Detroit, New York, Cleveland, and Boston. Ibid.
50. SELLIN 56-62. For the period 1919 through 1954, the police homicide rate per 100,000
population in Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana was as follows:
CITIES OF 10,000-30,000
State No. Cities No. Incidents Population Rate
Mich. 24 8 419,904 1.9
Ohio 21 7 317,623 1.9
Ind. 10 3 170,785 1.7
CITIES OF 30,000-60,000
Mich. 4 1 189,605 0.5
Ohio 7 3 223,303 1.3
Ind. 4 7 171,048 4.1
CITIES OF 60,000-100,000
Mich. 2 3 187,912 1.6
Ohio 2 1 146,379 0.7
Ind. no report
CITIES OF 100,000-350,000
Mich. 1 1 176,515 0.6
Ohio 3 14 635,389 2.2
Ind. 1 1 133,607 0.7
CITIES OF 500,000-650,000
Mich. no report
Ohio 1 13 503,998 2.6
Ind. no report
ALL CITIES REPORTING
Mich. 31 13 973,940 1.3
Ohio 34 38 1,880,692 2.2
Ind. 15 11 475,440 2.3
SELLIN 56.
51. SELUN 50-52. Professor Sellin studied 5 executions stemming from offenses in Phila-
delphia. Each execution was well publicized. Taking a sixty-day period before execution
and a sixty-day period after, there was a combined total of 105 days free from intentional
homicide before the executions and 74 days free from intentional homicide after the execu-
tions. There were 91 homicides in the "before execution" period and 113 homicides in the
"after execution" period. SELLIN 51. In a similar study using the dates of imposition of
four death sentences as a base it was found that in the pre-sentence period (eight weeks)
there were 23 definite capital homicides, and in the post-sentence period there were 28 defin-
ite capital homicides. In the pre-sentence period there were 20 homicides classified as "prob-
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of the impact of abolition followed by restoration. Neither in terms of
homicide death rate nor in terms of number of convictions for murder
52
was there any trend indicating that abolition produced an increase in
homicide and that restoration effected a decrease.53
No one who carefully reads the Sellin Report will claim that it is an
end-all.54 However, it is persuasive, and it does require a reply from
those who would retain the death penalty.
At the hearings, there was a reply of sorts. Initially, the retention-
ists were content to arrogate all expertise in the matter. They, as law en-
forcement officers, had "experience on the street." All others were char-
acterized as "closely allied with religious leaders," as "idealists," and as
persons who "adjust statistics,"' "o wherein there was an "adjustment" was
left to conjecture. It was claimed, however, that the statistical evidence
had to be incorrect because the existence of the death penalty for certain
federal offenses" converted every state into a capital punishment jurisdic-
tion. The claim, of course, is factually correct in that there is federal land
in every state upon which the commission of a murder may give rise to
the death penalty. But the claim is monstrously irrelevant to the question
of the validity of the statistics regarding deterrence. Indeed, any argu-
ment for relevance would have to proceed upon either or both of two un-
tenable assumptions: (1) that murders on federal land comprise a sig-
nificant part of all murders in a given abolition state;5  or (2) that a po-
tential murderer in an abolition state is deterred by the mistaken belief
that the contemplated offense is punishable under federal law. The re-
tentionist argument will not hold water.
ably capital," and in the post-sentence period there were 13 such homicides. Savitz, A Study
in Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 338, 340 (1958). It cannot be said as to
either study that the sample was adequate.
52. As to some states, Professor Sellin used the homicide death rate. As to other states he
was forced to use the number of murder convictions.
53. SELLIN 34-38.
54. In evaluating Professor Sellin's conclusions, it is necessary to keep in mind the factors
discussed in notes 43, 44, 46, 49, 51, and 52 supra. With particular reference to the abolition-
restoration problem, consideration should be given to the following: "In the thirty years from
1910 to 1939 the ten year average murder rate in England fell from 4.1 to 3.3 per million.
Yet if the death penalty had been abolished at the beginning of this period (1900), and if
this had resulted in 100 more murders than there actually were during this period, there
would still have been a substantial decrease (from 4.1 to 3.5 per million) in the murder rate
following this abolition." Hart, supra note 46, at 457.
55. These verbatim quotations are in the notes taken by me at the bearings.
56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 794 (gathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign
government), 1111 (murder), 1201 (kidnapping), 2031 (rape), 2381 (treason).
57. For 1961, it is estimated that 8,600 intentional homicides were known to the police.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, 152, chart no. 195 (1963). For fiscal
year 1962, in all of the federal district courts except those in the District of Columbia, Canal
Zone, Guam, and Virgin Islands, only 32 homicide cases of all types were disposed of. Six
of the cases resulted in convictions. Id. at 158, chart no. 207. For the period 1930-1957,
there were 3,081 state executions for murder. For the same period there were only 15 fed-
eral executions for murder. SELLUN 6.
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The second argument against the statistical position of the abolition-
ists was based on statements said to have been made to law enforcement
officers by burglars, safecrackers, and other offenders. The essence of
these statements was that the speaker, out of fear of the death penalty,
forebore either from carrying or from using a weapon or dissuaded a con-
federate from carrying or using a weapon. If these statements are credi-
ble, they form the basis for an appealing argument in favor of the death
penalty. Whether they are credible, however, is open to serious question.
As was observed in a leading study of the death penalty in Ohio:
Penologists and criminologists most familiar with research into prob-
lems of criminality place little credibility in the results of polls of
criminals in custody. Such persons, it is claimed, show a marked
tendency to give whatever answers they believe the interviewer is seek-
ing or answers which they believe will be to their advantage.58
But even if credibility is assumed, the matter is not resolved. First, there
is reason to doubt that the number of incidents referred to is statistically
significant."9 Second, and of greater importance, the statements, at best,
indicate only that the offender considered the penalty. They do not shed
light on the critical question of whether the death penalty deters murder
more effectively than a sentence to life imprisonment. Indeed, the of-
fenses typically referred to by the retentionists6 - - robbery, burglary, and
safecracking - either do not carry a maximum sentence of life imprison-
ment6 or involve only an alternate' and not frequently imposed63 sen-
tence of life imprisonment. Consequently, there is reason to doubt the
retentionists' position.
Ultimately, the retentionists abandoned any effort to deal on the
merits with the arguments against a theory of deterrence. They simply,
but forcefully, stated that they could not believe the statistics, and that
abolition in Ohio would increase the homicide rate two or three times
(the experience in the abolition-restoration states is a refutation of the
58. Omio REPoRT 35.
59. Ibid.
60. See ibid.
61. See O-mo REv. CODE §§ 2901.13 (armed robbery; 10-25 years) 2907.10 (burglary of
a building other than an inhabited dwelling- 1-15 years); 2907.12 (forcing entrance into
safe, vault or depository box; 1-20 years).
62. See Omo REv. CODE §§ 2907.09 (burglary at night of inhabited dwelling; life or
5-30 years); 2907.141 (malicious entry of financial institution; life or 20 year minimum, no
stated maximum).
63. Regarding the infrequency of a life sentence for burglary, the following is worth noting:
from 1955 to the third quarter of 1963, the Ohio State Penitentiary received 398 persons
convicted of burglary of an inhabited dwelling. Of this total, 321 (80.6%) were received
under a sentence to a term of years. Only 77 (19.4%) were received under a life sentence.
The 398 convicts comprised 6.2% of all convicts (6,439) received under a sentence for some
form of burglary. This data is cited from a letter to the author from E. L. Maxwell, Warden,
Ohio Penitentiary, October 25, 1963.
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latter point)." In what was perhaps the least analytical statement made
at the hearings, it was argued that the police, whether correctly or incor-
rectly, believe in the deterrent value of the death penalty, and that aboli-
tion of the death penalty would weaken police morale and therefore
would be undesirable.
It is a fair summary of the testimony presented at the hearings that
two basic arguments regarding deterrence clearly emerged. The argu-
ment of the abolitionists, resting on persuasive, albeit not conclusive, evi-
dence, was that there is "room for substantial doubt that any solid case
can be maintained for the death penalty, as it is employed in the United
States, as a deterrent to murder." 5  The argument for the retentionists,
based on introspection, was that the death penalty logically should be a
deterrent. Thus, one issue for the legislature was clearly drawn: whether
the state ought to kill certain offenders when the principal utilitarian
argument in favor of killing (deterrence) rests upon a demonstrably spec-
ulative foundation.66
DOES THE DEATH PENALTY SERVE A UTILITARIAN
PURPOSE OTHER THAN DETERRENCE?
Many of the remaining issues can fairly be grouped under the ques-
tion posed immediately above. In discussing these issues and in evaluat-
ing antagonistic arguments, care should be taken to distinguish between
two disparate questions: (1) whether a given utilitarian purpose ascribed
to the death penalty is, in fact, served; and (2) if so, whether it is the
sort of purpose that ought to be taken into account in assessing the de-
sirability of the death penalty. That both questions are important is
apparent from a consideration of the retentionists' argument that the
death penalty facilitates police investigation.
The Death Penalty as an Investigative Device
One of the claims made by the retentionists was that the death
penalty ought to be retained because the threat of electrocution can be
used by law enforcement officers as a wedge to induce a murderous
co-felon to implicate his confederates. Specifically how the device func-
tions was not discussed, and it cannot be determined whether, as utilized,
64. See notes 53, 54 supra and accompanying text.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE, comment 64 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
66. The resolution of this issue will depend in large part upon a dogmatic position regard-
ing burden of proof. Retentionists argue that the burden of proving non-deterrence is on
the abolitionists because it is they who seek to change the existing system. See Younger, supra
note 41, at 199. The position of this author as an abolitionist is that killing, whether ac-
complished by an individual or by the state, is an act of such gravity that proof of utility is
essential.
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the device runs counter to rules prohibiting the acquisition and use of in-
voluntary confessions." However, even if the question of voluntariness
is ignored, the retentionist argument is invalid because it proves too
much. The same argument, that police investigation is facilitated, could
just as well be urged in support of, confessions obtained by force, un-
lawful arrest, and unreasonable search and seizure.68 Implicit in the
argument is a premise that the end justifies the means. If the premise
is rejected, as it should be, the question remains as it was at the outset
whether the means can stand on their own merit.
The Death Penalty as a Counter-Recidivism Device
Another retentionist argument was that the death penalty is war-
ranted because rehabilitative methods have failed. The inarticulate
premise of the argument must be that paroled capital felons, in a sig-
nificant number of cases, continue with homicidal endeavor. That the
premise is incorrect is demonstrated by a study of the post-parole activities
of 169 first-degree, life-sentence murderers, all of whom had been sen-
tenced in Ohio. The study disclosed that 10 of the 169 parolees re-
turned to penal institutions, 2 for felonies of violence (but not resulting
in death), and 8 either for technical parole violations or for inability to
adjust to non-prison life. 9  The success rate was 94.1 per cent. The
success rate for all other parolees was 74 per cent.70 Studies in states
other than Ohio have yielded similar results."' Such results are not sur-
prising if it is kept in mind that a substantial percentage of first-degree
murderers are first offenders. Consequently, the fear of recidivism is
unjustified, and the death penalty, to the extent that it is deemed an
anti-recidivism device, is a cure for which there is really no disease.7 2
67. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), for a collection of cases on the con-
fessions rule.
68. See 1 STEPuHE!N, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 (1883): "During
the discussions which took place on the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure in 1872 some
observations were made on the reasons which occasionally lead native police officers to apply
torture to prisoners. An experienced civil officer observed, 'There is a great deal of laziness
in it. It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."'
69. OHIo REPORT 81-82.
70. Id. at 82.
71. Ibid. See also SELLIN 76-77 in which similar evidence pertaining to Pennsylvania and
California is noted.
72. Even if recidivism were a problem, the death penalty seems to be an exorbitant answer.
The position that killing is justified because cure is impossible is not unlike the position taken
by one of the characters in the comic-strip "Peanuts." After recounting an abortive effort to
engage a new neighbor in conversation, he concluded in substance, "I didn't know what to
say to her, so I hit her." SCHULZ, GOOD OL' CHA~RLIE BROWN 39 .(1958). Prolonged,
perhaps lifetime, detention of the potential recidivist would be a feasible alternative. And to
the answer that such detention is more cruel than death, my reply is that I choose not to play
God with another's life. At the very least, the choice of life or death should be the defendant's:
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The Death Penalty as a Device to
Facilitate Prison Administration
The final utilitarian argument of the retentionists was that the death
penalty facilitates discipline and thereby aids in prison administration.
It was asserted that, absent the death penalty, there would be no effective
deterrent for the first-degree, life-sentence murderer who, while serving
his sentence, killed a guard. Moreover, vague reference was made to
Black Muslims, apparently in an effort to suggest that imprisoned Black
Muslims would run riot absent the death penalty.
Obviously it cannot be determined authoritatively whether an exe-
cuted murderer would have been a disciplinary problem for prison ad-
ministrators if his life had been spared. Accordingly, any argument,
whether for retention or for abolition, is speculative. But it is clear that
first-degree, life-sentence murderers, as a class, pose no peculiar problem
for prison administrators.
Murderers serving life sentences, according to penal officials, know
that they will spend a long time in prison, and that their only hope of
release under any circumstances is through the earning of a parole.
Lifers are said to be the least likely of all prisoners to engage in be-
havior which will jeopardize that hope.73
Thus, there is built into the life sentence a natural deterrent, the desire
for release; and the fears of the retentionists again are not well-founded.74
In summary, whether in terms of prison administration, recidivism, or
police investigation, the utilitarian purposes attributed to the death pe-
nalty are fancied rather than real. Yet, these purposes and the general
deterrent purpose were advocated vigorously and sincerely by the reten-
tionists. Why? The "real" reasons behind their position must be
denied to all but the clairvoyant. An educated guess, however, might in-
clude three motivating factors: (1) a sort of "curbstone logic" regarding
the utilitarian purposes; (2) a belief that the death penalty is consonant
with a fair administration of criminal justice; and (3) a natural and
understandable tendency to sympathize with the victim and his loved
ones. The utilitarian arguments have already been explored. Considera-
tion will now be given to the remaining factors.
73. OHIO REPORT 79. The penal officials referred to in the quotation were from Ohio.
Their views are in agreement with the views of penal officials throughout the world. See
SELLIN 70-72, in which the author sets out replies received in response to a study, undertaken
in 1950, by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission.
74. Suppose, however, that a convicted murderer had no hope for release. Would the death
penalty be the only effective deterrent to subsequent killing in prison? Although speculation
is admitted, the answer should still be in the negative. It is submitted that the threat of
legitimate self-defensive action by armed guards would be at least as effective a deterrent as
the threat of the death penalty. Indeed, as a more immediate threat, it might well be a more
effective deterrent.
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Is THE DEATH PENALTY CONSONANT WITH A FAIR
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE?
To the abolitionists' argument that there are serious inequities in the
administration of the death penalty, the retentionists' reply was little
more tian a general denial. It was asserted that indigent murderers are
capably defended by court-appointed counsel, and that if there are in-
equities, then "our judicial system is wrong." The retentionists thus were
content to rest upon their belief in the impartiality and accuracy of the
judicial process. A discussion of the validity of that belief was left
to the abolitionists. Their arguments will be noted briefly.
Inequality and Sex
Typically, in debates upon the death penalty, abolitionists contend
that sex is a factor in the imposition and execution of a death sentence,
and that it is less likely that a female defendant will be executed than
a male defendant. This same claim was made before the House Judici-
ary Committee during the recent hearings, and statistical evidence per-
tinent to Ohio was introduced in support of the claim. For the period
1955-1960, 495 persons were charged with first-degree murder in Ohio.
Of this total, 430 (approximately 87 per cent) were men; 65 (ap-
proximately 13 per cent) were women. Of the 430 male defendants,
136 (approximately 31.6 per cent) were found guilty of first-degree
murder. Of the 65 female defendants, only 5 (approximately 7.7 per
cent) were found guilty of first-degree murder.75 Thus, it is clear that
conviction of first-degree murder, a necessary pre-requisite to the imposi-
tion and execution of the death sentence, was more readily obtained
in the case of the male defendant than in the case of the female de-
fendant. And it is equally dear that, in terms of actual execution, the
female has maintained her advantage. During the period 1930-1954,
only 3 women were executed in Ohio,"6 and, from 1955 to date, there
have been no executions of female prisoners.77
Inequality and Race
It might be suspected that juries have a greater inclination to with-
hold a recommendation of mercy in cases of Negro defendants than in
cases of Caucasian defendants. Regarding Ohio, the suspicion is ground-
75. Omo R pORT 61.
76. SELLiN 6.
77. This information was furnished by an employee in the office of the Warden of the Ohio
State Penitentiary. From the same source it was learned that of the three executions referred
to in the text accompanying note 76 .rupra, two took place in 1954.
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less.7" In terms of commutation, however, the statistics tell a completely
different story. During the period 1950-1959, 38 per cent of all death-
sentence prisoners received commutation. Of all Caucasian death-sen-
tence prisoners, 49 per cent received commutation. However, of all
Negro death-sentence prisoners, only 22 per cent received commuta-
tion.79 Thus, the abolitionists argued, the chance of commutation for
the Caucasian prisoner was four times the chance of commutation for the
Negro prisoner.
Inequality and Geographical Location
The abolitionists presented to the committee the results of a study
devoted to the question of whether juries in certain Ohio counties have a
greater tendency to impose the death penalty than jurors in other Ohio
counties. The study disclosed the following:
[I]t would appear that differences have existed among counties of
about the same size in Ohio in readiness of juries to impose the death
penalty. Counties with comparable homicide rates and comparable
murder conviction rates, furthermore, may differ in death sentence
rates. [The comparisons made during the study] suggest the possibility
that juries in some counties are more likely to extend mercy to murder
convicts than are juries in other counties. A murderer who commits
his crime in Greene or Crawford county, for example, has a much better
statistical chance of avoiding the death sentence than the murderer who
commits his crime in Belmont or Athens county.s0
The abolitionists demanded a reply from the retentionists. As noted
above, however, their reply was an unsupported statement of their be-
lief in the accuracy, impartiality, and fairness of the existing system.
Inequality and Representation by Counsel
Under enlightened Ohio law, long antedating recent Supreme Court
cases, every indigent felon is entitled to representation by court-ap-
pointed counsel.8 2 The question raised by the abolitionists was whether
it was more likely that the death sentence would be executed in the
case of the indigent defendant than in the case of the non-indigent. On
the basis of a recent study, the argument of the abolitionists was that,
in terms of execution, the indigent defendant was at a significant disad-
vantage. The study, embracing the 67 death sentences imposed during
78. OHIO REPORT 62. As of April 1, 1960, Negroes comprised 39.8% of all Ohio prison-
ers. They comprised 37.3% of all death-sentence prisoners for the period 1950-1959.
79. Ibid.
80. Id. at 59. A detailed comparison of county-by-county statistics appears at 54-59.
81. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
82. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2941.50-.51.
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the period 1950-1959, revealed that the defendant was executed in 50
per cent of the cases defended by retained counsel, and in 57.2 per cent
of the cases defended by court-appointed counsel.83 Moreover, the sen-
tence was commuted in 44.4 per cent of the cases defended by retained
counsel, but in only 30.6 per cent of the cases defended by court-appointed
counsel.84
These figures, particularly as they relate to commutations, were
wholly ignored by the retentionists.
The "Innocent" Defendant and the Death Penalty
Sooner or later, in any discussion of the death penalty, attention must
be given to the argument that either the death penalty results in the
taking of some innocent life or it creates the unreasonable risk that
innocent life will be taken. This argument was urged upon the members
of the House Judiciary Committee with full realization that, as the
number of executions in any jurisdiction diminishes, the opportunity for
miscarriage of justice also diminishes.
Initially, the abolitionists claimed that because human judgment is
fallible some innocent persons had been convicted. Reference was made
to numerous cases, including two Ohio cases, involving conviction of the
innocent.85 Influential in these unfortunate convictions were mistaken
identity and impeachment of credibility through evidence of prior con-
victions.86 Although some of the defendants came perilously dose to
death, it was admitted that in none of the cases was the defendant exe-
cuted.
Next, it was claimed on the basis of other evidence, that some in-
nocents had been executed.' It was admitted that the number of known
83. Omo REPORT 63.
84. Ibid. The figures do not total 100% because they exclude the percentage of convicts
who were awaiting execution at the time of the study.
85. Cases are collected in BORcHARD, CONVICT1NG THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK &
FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957). The two Ohio cases are State v. McKinney, 77 Ohio App.
309, 64 N.E.2d 129 (1945) (BORCHARD 154), and State v. Thornton, No. 8649, Butler
County C.P., Feb. 15, 1957 (BoRcHARD 27).
86. In the McKinney case, supra note 85, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree
murder of a policeman. He was "identified' after the police dressed him in garments similar
to those worn by the assailant. In addition, his record of prior convictions was used to im-
peach his credibility. Months after the conviction, another person confessed, was indicted,
and pleaded guilty. McKinney was released. In the Thornton case, supra note 85, the de-
fendant was convicted of robbery. The victim, a newly-arrived immigrant, provided the
identification. Other links in the chain were that one John Ivory was identified as a co-felon;
that he was jailed; that Thornton visited him in jail; that there was a joint trial; that the evi-
dence against Ivory was strong; and that Thornton's alibi witnesses had bad reputations.
Eleven months later another person confessed and Thornton was released.
87. In SELLIN 64, the following is stated: "It is claimed that both Maine and Rhode Island
abolished the death penalty because of the execution, in each of these states, of an innocent
person." As evidence in support of the statement, Professor Sellin refers to a letter from
Edmund S. Muskie, then Governor of Maine, and to a letter from John A. Murphy, then
1964]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
erroneous convictions far exceeds the number of known executions, and
that the number of known erroneous executions is small. Indeed, it
was conceded that in no Ohio case had innocence been proved after
execution. In explanation of the latter, it was asserted that, in the case
of the life-sentence convict, friends and relatives frequently undergo
great financial sacrifice to obtain release, but in the case of the executed
convict financial sacrifice is fruitless. In any event, it was the position
of the abolitionists that Ohio's system of criminal justice ought not to
permit even the risk of killing an innocent person.
Two arguments relevant to the issue under consideration were over-
looked by the abolitionists. The first argument is that a defendant,
guilty of some form of homicide, may erroneously be convicted of first-
degree murder. State v. Salter 88 is a hideous example. The defendant,
preparatory to raping an eleven year old girl, attempted to anesthetize
her with chloroform. The dosage administered would probably not have
been fatal under ordinary circumstances. However, the victim had an
unusual glandular condition which made the administration of any
anesthetic highly dangerous, and, as a result of the chloroform, she died.
Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder was affirmed by a divided
Ohio Supreme Court in spite of the facts that the defendant had no
motive to kill and no desire to kill, and that he remained at the scene,
awakened the victim's family, called the fire department emergency
squad, and attempted artificial respiration. Salter was executed.89 Clearly
he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter under Ohio law." Arguably
his conduct was sufficiently reckless to establish murder under the law
of some other jurisdictions."' But in Ohio, intent to kill is a sine qua non
to liability for first-degree murder even though the killing occurs during
Chief of Police, Providence, Rhode Island. Perhaps the most celebrated case involved the
conviction and execution in England of Timothy Evans for the murder of his wife and child.
After the execution, there was discovered compelling evidence that the murderer was the prose-
cution's chief witness. The case is discussed in HALE, HANGED IN ERROR 90-110 (1961). The
author reports that the Home Secretary stated, "I think Evans' case shows, in spite of all that
has been done since, that a mistake was possible, and that, in the form in which the verdict
was actually given in a particular case, a mistake was made." Id. at 10. In addition, the
author recounts part of a debate in 1961 in the House of Commons in which the then Home
Secretary stated: "It may be said, and it may be true - and I will acknowledge this from
the box - that if the facts as they are now known had been known in 1950 the jury would
not have found that the case against Evans had been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. I
am saying that deliberately and with authority." Id. at 110.
88. 149 Ohio St. 264, 78 N.E.2d 575 (1948).
89. This information was furnished by an employee in the office of the Warden of the
Ohio State Penitentiary.
90. OHIO REV. CODE § 2091.06.
91. See MODEL PEN. CODE § 201.2, (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959), for a proposed statutory
formulation of the "recklessness" criterion and for a collection of cases in which this criterion
is applied.
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the commission of a felony. 2 That the evidence fell short of establish-
ing intent seems clear from just a statement of the facts.9" At the very
least, a compelling argument can be made against the decision, a decision
which cost the defendant his life under Ohio's system of capital punish-
ment.
The second argument is that a life-sentence defendant may well be
accorded the retroactive benefit of changes in the law. For example,
some recent federal cases have given retroactive effect to Mapp v. Ohio94
and have overturned state convictions antedating Mapp in which il-
legally obtained evidence was utilized by the prosecution.95 The convic-
tion of an executed defendant may also have been tainted by illegally
acquired evidence. It too should be overturned. But death and moot-
ness are both permanent.
In summary, some defendants are not guilty of any offense, others
are not guilty of the offense charged, and still others ought to be given a
new trial. But the death penalty is irrevocable, and errors, whether of
fact or law, are beyond correction. That such errors do occur, although
not very often, is demonstrable. And the occurrence of each such error
is a rebuke to those who believe that any system of law can be adminis-
tered with pervasive accuracy.
If the question of accuracy is put to one side, the questions of equality
and fairness still remain. How fair is a system in which the risk of execu-
tion is materially increased if the defendant is a male Negro represented
in Belmont County by court-appointed counsel, and in which the risk is
materially decreased if the defendant is a female Caucasian represented
in Greene County by retained counsel?
Is THE DEATH PENALTY BASED ON VENGEANCE?
The criminal process is supposed to serve a screening function. At
each step - arrest, preliminary examination, grand jury inquiry, trial,
and appeal - those whose innocence is likely are weeded out. Those
92. Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N. 425 (1934), af'd per curiam by equally
divided court, 129 Ohio St. 245, 194 N.E. 453 (1935).
93. The validity of the statement in the text depends upon the definition of intent. Under
Ohio case-law, there is reason to suggest that intent means desire. See Robbins v. State, 8
Ohio St. 131 (1857); Turk v. State, supra note 92. Salter dearly did not desire death. How-
ever, even if the definition reasonably were broadened to include foreseeability of the very
strong likelihood of death, see HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 53 (1881) ("that the act done
will very certainly cause death, and the probability is a matter of common knowledge...."),
the definition would not embrace the Salter facts. The only definition of intent consonant
with the Salter result is the following: A person intends to kill if he applies a potentially
dangerous device to the person of another and thereby kills the other. The definition comes
perilously close to equating intention with causation.
94. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
95. See, e.g., Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); Hall v. Warden, 313
F.2d 483 (4th Cr. 1963).
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whose guilt is likely are moved on to the next step for further screening."6
The process operates in much the same way regarding the death penalty,
although there are fewer steps. The prosecutor may elect not to ask for
the death penalty; the jury may recommend mercy and thereby impose
a life sentence; the governor may commute a death sentence. That the
process does so operate is dear from a comparison for any given period
of the number of indictments for first-degree murder and the number of
executions."
What criteria are used by the decision-makers in this death-penalty
screening process? It is suggested that, whatever other criteria might be
involved, the criterion of vengeance or retribution or heinousness of the
offense is a significant one. The prosecutor who argues for "selective
use" of the death penalty, an argument made at the hearings, must have
in mind the selection for death of the defendant whose crime is the most
predatory and brutal and whose conduct is the least explainable or un-
derstandable. There is some evidence that juries function in a similar
manner. During a fifteen year period, the California Supreme Court
remanded for new trial 25 death-sentence cases. In only 3 of the cases
was the defendant again sentenced to death.98 One can imagine many
factors which may have produced this result, but one cannot reject out-of-
hand the notion that the retrials, removed in point of time from the inci-
dent, lacked the emotional impact of the original trials, and that there
was a consequent mitigation of horror in assessing the defendant's conduct.
In public debate, retentionists seldom argue expressly that vengeance
is a justification for the death penalty. But it takes no penetrating analy-
sis to perceive the substantial undertone of vengeance. The argument of
"selective use," already referred to, is one manifestation. Others are avail-
able. At the hearings in support of the position that Ohioans want the
death penalty, it was asserted that persons who opposed the death penalty
came to favor it after loved ones had been murdered.9 One retentionist
blithely observed that if the death penalty were abolished, he would have
no satisfactory answer when relatives of the deceased inquired about the
punishment of the defendant. And another repeatedly urged the death
penalty for "rats" and "brutal" murderers. That these arguments are
based upon vengeance is obvious.
96. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE I.J. 1149 (1960).
97. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
98. Note, Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN. L REV.
94, 104 (1958).
99. The assertion was appalrently based on an article appearing in a Columbus, Ohio news-
paper after the trial of Donald Reinbolt. In this article, the victim's daughter stated her be-
lief that the death penalty was "not revenge, not anger, but honest justice." Columbus Citizen
Journal, Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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It is not necessary, however, to denigrate the idea of vengeance. Nor
is it necessary to suggest to the victim's friends and relatives that they turn
the other cheek, that they try to understand the murderer, his motivations,
or the pressures under which he acted. It would be impertinent to say
to those law enforcement officers who must observe the dead and comfort
the living that they should not sympathize with the bereaved. However,
it is necessary to ask whether the state should undertake to satisfy under-
standable feelings of vengeance, and whether vengeance is an appropriate
basis for the state's administration of criminal law. Some will say yes.""0
My answer is no, and the answer rests in part upon dogma and in part
upon doubts that the sciences of the mind sufficiently understand the
concept of free will which underlies the argument for vengeance.'
CONCLUSION
In this article an attempt has been made to assess critically the argu-
ments in favor of capital punishment presented to the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the Ohio House of Representatives. The argument that the
death penalty is a deterrent seems to boil down to two questions: whether
the argument is anything more than speculative, and, if so, whether specu-
lation is a legitimate predicate for legalized killing. The argument that
the death penalty serves other utilitarian purposes is, in my view, demon-
strably unsound, as is the argument that the death penalty is consonant
with a fair, impartial, and accurate administration of criminal law.
In 1912, the question of abolition through constitutional amendment
was submitted to the electorate. It was defeated by 44,540 votes, 303,246
to 258,706.102 The defeat, hardly an overwhelming one, took place at a
time when judicial record-keeping was rudimentary and there was no
body of statistical evidence against which the arguments for retention
could be measured. Such evidence is available now. But whether Ohio,
in the second half of the twentieth century, will be enlightened by it
remains to be seen.
100. See SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 116 (10th ed. 1947): "The emotion of retributive
indignation, both in its self-regarding and in its sympathetic forms, is even yet the mainspring
of the criminal law. It is to the fact that the punishment of the wrongdoer is at the same
time the venegeance of the wronged, that the administration of justice owes a great part of its
strength and effectiveness."
101. On the relationship between free will and vengeance, see Younger, Capital Punishment:
A Sharp Medicine Reconsidered, 42 A.B.AJ. 113 (1956).
102. OHIo REPORT 10.
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